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The opening of stock markets in Asian, Latin American and other developing countries 
over the past decade has been widely praised, as there are many potential benefits of 
financial integration with the rest of the world. However, the turmoil in emerging markets 
since the Mexican, Asian, and Russian crises have led policy makers and investors to 
wonder whether greater financial openness may actually increase the volatility of stock 
returns. The variance of share returns has important implications for determining portfolio 
allocation as well as the cost of capital, and if variability rises it may counteract some of the 
benefits of openness. Theory o n the effects of market opening on volatility has been 
ambiguous, and empirical work has yielded conflicting results. This paper examines the 
issue by testing for a larger variety of reforms than have been studied before. Moreover, the 
data set employed spans important episodes such as the Asian, Russian and Brazilian 
devaluations which have occurred since previous empirical studies were written. Results 
indicate that reform has a statistically significant impact in almost three fifths of the 
emerging markets surveyed, but more often than not, the effect is actually to raise, rather 
than lower the volatility of stock returns. 
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1.  I NTRODUCTION 
 
The past decade has  been a period of widespread deregulation and opening in 
emerging financial markets in Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere. This trend toward 
greater openness has been hailed by many academics and commentators, yet at the same 
time, as liberalization has proceeded, there has been notable turmoil in the form of 
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episodes such as the Mexican, Asian, Russian and Brazilian devaluations and financial 
crises. This paper will focus on the effect liberalization has on the volatility of returns in 
emerging stock markets. 
The recent opening in emerging financial markets has generated a large literature, 
with many commentators predicting that such liberalization will increase the inflow of 
foreign capital, leading to greater financial development and economic growth. In 
principle, some models maintain that a market opening should decrease the variability of 
asset prices. The more able investors are to adjust the quantity of their portfolios in 
response to shocks, the less impact there should be on prices, and hence the volatility of 
returns should fall (see Reinhart (1998)). However, the tumultuous events in developing 
countries over the last few years have led some practitioners and policymakers to 
question whether opening may in fact substantially raise the volatility of asset prices. 
Moreover, several papers examining the behavior of recently liberalized stock exchanges 
(Borenzstein and Gelos (2000), Froot, O’Connell and Seasholes (1999), and Kaminsky, 
Lyons and Schmukler  (1999)) have found strong evidence of herding, momentum 
trading, and trend chasing, all of which can substantially increase, rather than decrease, 
the volatility of share prices.   
There have been previous studies which have examined the effect of liberalization 
on stock volatility (Bekaert and Harvey  (1997), DeSantis and Imrohoroglu  (1997), 
Inclan, Aggarwal, and Leal  (1997), Kim and Singal  (2000), and Levine and Servos 
(1998)). All of these papers have made important contributions to the understanding of 
deregulations’ effects on volatility. They have presented conflicting findings. Depending 
on the method and sample employed, some find that liberalization raises the variance of 
returns, others find no significant effect, and some find that volatility has decreased as a 
result of deregulation. 
This paper will expand this research in two important directions. First, more types of 
liberalization will be examined than have been previously. As will be explained, the 
removal of official restrictions on foreign participation may not capture true liberalization. 
The regulations may have previously been evaded. Moreover, the effect of market 
opening depends importantly on the state of global financial conditions. The second 
extension of previous research is the inclusion of data that spans the Asian, Russian and 
Brazilian devaluations. These events may well have a palpable impact on the estimated 
response of volatility to liberalization. Previous papers have examined post-liberalization 
periods which for many countries begin around 1990 and end near 1996. In retrospect, 
this period looks deceptively tranquil, save for the Mexican crisis of 1994-1995. Failing 
to include the late 1990s in the sample may give a misleading picture of reforms’ effect 
on the variance of returns. Results here will indicate that opening has increased volatility 
for some, and decreased it for others, depending on individual country circumstances. 
This paper proceeds as follows. The previous literature on liberalization and stock 
return volatility is reviewed. The data and methodology are discussed in the next section. 
Results, indicating both a positive and negative effect on volatility depending on country 
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2.    PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON LIBERALIZATION AND VOLATILITY 
 
The effect of liberalization on stock market volatility has concerned both academics 
and practitioners, and the turbulence of emerging markets in the last several years has 
only accentuated the importance of the issue for policymakers. The previous literature 
has been often enlightening but also yielded conflicting results on the expected impact of 
market opening. 
Theoretically, Reinhart (1998) models the effect of capital controls on domestic 
stock markets, and concludes that such restrictions should raise the volatility of prices. 
The rationale is that when investors are constrained in adjusting the quantity of asset 
holdings in response to a shock, more of the response falls on price, raising the latter’s 
variability. Conversely, it would thus be expected that the removal of controls on foreign 
investment in local equity should lower volatility in prices. This theory has intuitive 
appeal in light of most standard asset pricing models. 
However, other papers give reason to question the hope that fewer restrictions lead 
to more tranquil price changes. Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (2000) demonstrate 
that, during the Asian and Russian difficulties, nations whose markets were most liquid 
(and thus, in important respects more open by criteria such as volume traded as a 
fraction of output, lack of capital controls, the share of the country in mutual fund 
portfolios and the trading of local stocks in developed equity markets) tended to suffer 
the greater sell-offs by mutual funds than those nations with less liquid, and thus more 
closed, exchanges, all else constant. For instance, China, a nation with clear fundamental 
difficulties, suffered little stock market volatility during the Asian and Russian episodes, 
while Taiwan and Hong Kong, each with better fundamentals than the mainland, 
suffered from sharp selling as mangers of open-ended mutual funds sought cash for 
redemptions. 
There are other findings which qualify the case for liberalization leading to less 
variability. Froot, O’Connell and Seasholes (1999) find that, unlike in developed bourses, 
the purchases and sales of institutional investors have predictive power for future price 
movements in emerging financial markets. This finding may imply that institutional 
investors have better information than local agents, or that such institutions have the 
power to move prices and affect volatility in a way they cannot in developed-country 
exchanges. The authors also find evidence of positive feedback trading, or trend 
following, in which past returns influence current flows. Borenzstein and Gelos (2000) 
find strong evidence of herding behavior by mutual fund managers in emerging markets. 
These funds tend to follow momentum strategies, buying past winners and selling past 
losers, potentially further adding to volatility. And indeed the turmoil observed in many 
developing countries has led to calls for greater restrictions on capital mobility, rather 
than greater opening (see Krugman (1999)). 
Given the conflicting predictions of such papers, it is not surprising that attempts to 
empirically measure the impact of stock market opening have yielded different results. 
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divergent findings. Aggarwal, Inclan and Leal (1997) examine emerging equity market 
volatility through changes in conditional volatility (GARCH models) but do not test for 
the effect of liberalization. Bekaert and Harvey (1997) find that liberalization generally, 
although not always, leads to lower conditional volatility for a sample of developing 
countries. Levine and Zervos (1998), on the other hand, find that the rolling standard 
deviation (corrected for autocorrelation) of most stock returns tends to rise following a 
market opening. Kim and Singal (2000) find, when employing ARCH and GARCH 
models, that aggregate conditional variance for all emerging markets in their sample 
decreases marginally after opening. Later, a parametric test of volatility suggests no 
difference before and after liberalization, while a non-parametric test indicates a 
decrease in variance. DeSantis and Imrohoroglu (1997) employ a GARCH model, and 
split the sample at the end of 1989, which is taken as a proxy for market opening for five 
countries. In three of the five nations, volatility is greater before 1990 than after. 
The divergent results on volatility doubtless derive in part from differing methods 
and samples, as well as different dates used as the reform period. And indeed, even if 
there is a uniform method employed, country experience of similar reforms can be 
different depending o n the institutional arrangements of the domestic financial sector 
and the state of global financial conditions at the time of liberalization. This paper will 
accordingly model volatility for seventeen countries as a GARCH process, and rather 
than imposing one uniform date on all countries, or even looking at one type of reform 
for all nations, will look at five different types of market openings. 
 
 
3.    DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The data comes from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) Emerging Markets 
Data Base (EMDB). Monthly data on stock index prices for seventeen countries begins, 
for some, in December of 1975 and runs through April of 2001. As noted, this sample 
spans the turbulent period of the Asian and Russian crises, as well as the Brazilian 
devaluation of January 1999, which the previously cited papers did not include. The 
inclusion of the more volatile periods can have a palpable impact on the estimated 
conditional variances. The nations are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, India, Jordan, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, 
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. The variable modeled will be returns, here the difference in 
the log of dollar index prices. The dates for liberalization are displayed in table one.   
 
 
Table 1.  Liberalization Dates in Emerging Markets 
  Official  ADR  Fund  U.S. Flows 
Argentina  Nov. 1989  Aug. 1991  Nov. 1991  April 1994 
Brazil  May 1991  Jan. 1992  Oct. 1987  June 1988 
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Table 1.  (Continued) 
  Official  ADR  Fund  U.S. Flows 
Chile  Jan. 1992  March 1990  Sept. 1989  Jan. 1988 
Columbia  Feb. 1991  Dec. 1992  May 1992  Aug. 1993 
India  Nov. 1992  Feb. 1992  June 1986  April 1993 
Jordan  Dec. 1995  -  -  - 
Korea  Jan. 1992  Nov. 1990  Aug. 1984  March 1993 
Malaysia  Dec. 1988  Aug. 1992  Dec. 1987  April 1992 
Mexico  Nov. 1989  Jan. 1989  June 1981  May 1990 
Nigeria  Aug. 1998  -  -  - 
Pakistan  Feb. 1991  -  Sept. 1997  April 1993 
Philippines  June 1991  March 1993  May 1987  Jan. 1990 
Portugal  July 1986  June 1990  Aug. 1987  Aug. 1994 
Taiwan  Jan. 1991  Dec. 1991  May 1986  Aug. 1992 
Thailand  Sept. 1987  Jan. 1991  July 1985  July 1988 
Turkey  Aug. 1989  Sept. 1997  Dec. 1989  Dec. 1989 
Venezuela  Jan. 1990  Aug. 1991  -  Feb. 1992 
Zimbabwe  June 1993  -  -  - 
Source: Bekaert and Harvey (2000). 
 
 
Some previous papers have measured the unconditional variance, while others have 
estimated the variance conditional on its own past. The latter are generally measured in 
ARCH (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity) or GARCH (Generalized ARCH) 
models. These models have now become standard in measuring volatility in developed 
countries and in emerging markets, as investors are interested in the variance over a 
holding period, rather than the unconditional variance. Moreover, an increase in the 
conditional variance is also an increase in the unconditional variance. Therefore 
GARCH models will be employed here. 
The models, at their most general, are as follows: 
 
t t t r r e b a + + = -1 ,                                                    (1) 
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Here,  t r  denotes the monthly return, and  t e  is a random error. In this specification, 
the variance is subject to persistent shocks, and hence the conditional, rather than the 
unconditional variance is modeled. In Equation (2), the conditional variance follows an 
asymmetric GARCH  ) , ( q p  process. That is, the variance follows and ARMA process, WILLIAM MILES  118
with the 
2
t s  terms representing the AR portion and the 
2
t e  terms the moving average. 
The middle term,  1
2
1 - - t t d ge  represents the asymmetric portion of the conditional variance. 
Here, the dummy variable,  1 - t d  is equal to one if  0 < t e , and zero otherwise. Thus, 
negative shocks raise volatility by more than positive innovations. This specification is 
based on a finding by Black (1976). It has been argued that negative shocks raise the 
leverage of firms, thus leading to higher variability. The structural economic reasons for 
this empirical regularity are still debated, but this effect has very often been found in 
equity markets, and thus it seems important to allow for it. Models that include this 
asymmetric effect are termed Threshold GARCH, or T-GARCH models.   
There exist a number of criteria for choosing the correct number of lags and 
specification in GARCH models, (AIC, SIC, maximum likelihood, etc.). Since 
consistency of the estimates is of overriding importance, a conservative strategy of 
choosing a model based on no remaining correlation in the squared residuals was used. 
Thus, for each nation, the specification of ARCH, GARCH, asymmetry and lag length 
chosen depended on testing for the absence of remaining ARCH effects using a 
LaGrange Multiplier test once a given model had been estimated. That is, once a 
GARCH model has been estimated, the remaining squared residuals should exhibit no 
autocorrelation. If there were remaining ARCH effects, the model is adjusted by adding 
parameters until the effects were no longer significant. There are therefore different 
models for the nations. Some specifications had no GARCH terms, some had no 
asymmetry parameter, and there were a variety of lag lengths chosen. Table two contains 
the particular GARCH specification chosen for each country index, as well as the results 
of the LM tests for autocorrelation in the squared residuals of the models. As shown, for 
no model can the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation be rejected at anything close to a 
standard significance level. Given the well-known findings regarding the non-normality 
of return residuals in both developed and emerging equity markets, robust Bollerslev- 
Wooldridge standard errors were employed for all countries.   
 
 
Table 2.  GARCH Models and LM Tests 
Country  Model  P-Value on ARCH LM Test 
Argentina  GARCH(1,1)  0.748 
Brazil  T-GARCH(1,1)  0.889 
Chile  GARCH(1,1)  0.362 
Columbia  T-GARCH(2,1)  0.660 
India  T-GARCH(2,1)  0.775 
Jordan  T-GARCH(1,1)  0.390 
Korea  T-GARCH(1,1)  0.798 
Malaysia  GARCH(1,1)  0.892 
Mexico  GARCH(1,1)  0.687 
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Table 2.  (Continued) 
Country  Model  P-Value on ARCH LM Test 
Nigeria  GARCH(1,1)  0.990 
Pakistan  T-GARCH(2,1)  0.395 
Philippines  GARCH(1,2)  0.885 
Portugal  GARCH(1,1)  0.773 
Taiwan  GARCH(1,1)  0.964 
Thailand  ARCH(2)  0.775 
Venezuela  T-GARCH(1,1)  0.931 
Zimbabwe  ARCH(4)  0.886 
 
 
Given the baseline models, the next step is to test for the significance of measures of 
reform. Previous papers have used one date for all countries, or have used one type of 
reform, such as official market opening for all the emerging markets under study. 
Because of the ambiguities associated with certain reforms, the models here will be used 
to test for the effectiveness of five different types of market opening. The first, and most 
straightforward, is the removal of official restrictions on foreign investment in domestic 
capital markets. The dates for each country are taken from Bekaert and Harvey (2000), 
as are the dates for three of the other four reforms. While this measure is used frequently 
in other studies, and is intuitively the most clear example of a market opening, it is not 
without problems of interpretation. For example, such restrictions may be evaded, at 
least partially. Some studies of capital controls in emerging markets over the 1990s find 
that such regulations are only partially effective. These restrictions may influence the 
volume, but not the composition of total inflows in some nations, or only affect foreign 
investment in the short term, but not in the longer run, in other countries (see Cardoso 
and Goldfajn (1998), and Montiel and Reinhart (1999)). Thus their removal may not 
represent much of a change in investment opportunities for foreigners seeking to buy 
domestic stocks. 
A related reason that removal of official restrictions may not capture the true change 
in market opening is that the level of capital inflows into an emerging market depends 
very importantly on the world financial environment, possibly more than it depends on 
the official policy stance of the emerging market toward foreign stock purchases. Just as 
a nation may employ an ineffective regime of controls on stock purchases by foreigners, 
it may remove official restrictions and experience little subsequent increase in equity 
inflows. For example, a number of authors (Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart  (1993), 
Fernandez-Arias (1996), Taylor and Sarno (1997)) have found that much, perhaps most, 
of the capital which flowed into emerging markets in the early 1990s was motivated not 
so much by improved investment conditions or high returns in those nations but by the 
poor returns then available in developed countries. This surge in inflows after 1989 took 
place just after many developing countries had been effectively rationed out of world WILLIAM MILES  120
capital markets in the aftermath of the 1980s debt crisis. Papers such as those mentioned 
above found that low interest rates and stock returns in the United States, Japan and 
Europe encouraged investors to seek higher returns in emerging markets. Capital flowed 
to many nations in very different stages of economic growth and reform. And conversely, 
in other periods, almost no financial inflows from the developed world are available, as 
was the case for Latin America from the 1930s until the 1970s. Thus one type of market 
opening is the change in the external environment that arises when funds are “pushed” 
into the local stock market, rather than being “pulled” by domestic reforms and 
conditions. 
Accordingly, two dates are employed to capture the changes that the world financial 
markets brought to developing countries. The first is the structural break in the flow of 
U.S. funds into the local stock market. The date for this break for each country is taken 
from Bekaert and Harvey (2000). The United States is the only country for which flow 
of funds data into emerging stock markets is available on such a basis. Of course, this is 
an imperfect measure, as there are other nations, and the U.S. flows are subject to 
measurement error. Thus, a second date is employed for all countries to capture the 
change in the world financial condition-December 1989. This date is marked by 
previous authors such as Fernandez-Arias as the point at which investors in the 
developed world began sending funds on a large scale to emerging markets. DeSantis 
and Imrohoroglu also employ the date as the break point at which they split their sample 
for five nations and examine changes in variance. Thus this date will be used for all 
seventeen countries. 
Finally two other measures of market opening were employed. The first is the date 
on which country funds were originally introduced for a given nation. Country funds are 
closed-end mutual funds which invest in a given nation’s stock market. They provide a 
vehicle (initially perhaps the only vehicle) for investors in the U.S., Europe or Japan to 
purchase shares in a certain emerging market. Diwan, Errunza and Senbet (1993) show 
theoretically that the introduction of country funds increases capital mobilization and 
augments market efficiency for stock exchanges. The second is the introduction of 
American Depository Receipts, or ADRs. These are rights to foreign stocks which trade 
in the United States. As explained in Bekaert and Harvey (2000), these instruments may 
help overcome both official restrictions and information asymmetries for investors. 
Their effects are theoretically similar to those of country funds. The date of introduction, 
for both country funds and ADRs will again be taken from Bekaert and Harvey (2000). 
To measure the impact of each reform, it would be optimal to have a continuous 
measure of foreign investor participation. The fraction of foreign investor trading 
volume, for instance, would be a good independent variable to include as a determinant 
of volatility. However, such data is not available, and thus studies of liberalization all 
rely on some sort of dummy variable or structural break at the time of deregulation to 
gauge the impact of market opening. Accordingly, dummy variables for each country 
will be added to the models which take on a value of 1 after reform and zero before. 
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t t t r r e b a + + = -1 ,                                                    (3) 
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was estimated for all countries, identical to the original T-GARCH models, except for 
the addition of the  D d  term, where  D  is the policy dummy. This is the same method 
used by Edison and Reinhart (1999) to measure the impact of capital restrictions during 
the Asian crisis on a set of financial and economic variables. Edwards (1998) also 
employed the method to test for contagion over crisis periods in Latin American markets. 
As with these authors, the dummy variable will be used to test for a structural change in 
the conditional volatility process itself, using a t-test. 
 
 
4.    RESULTS 
 
The results of testing for the effects of different reform measures are displayed in 
tables three through six. 
 
 
Table 3.   Estimates of GARCH and Market Opening Effects: Columbia, India, Nigeria 
Columbia  Coefficient  T-Stat  P-Value 
ARCH(1)  0.163  1.794  0.072 
ARCH(2)  0.168  1.472  0.140 
TARCH(1)  0.335641  4.08  0.00 
GARCH(1)  0.439  2.57  0.01 
Avg. Return  1.205     
Official  25.75  2.20  0.0278 
India  Coefficient  T-Stat  P-Value 
ARCH(1)  0.1953  2.01  0.043 
ARCH(2)  0.18  1.87  0.0612 
TARCH(1)  0.0705  1.532  0.1253 
GARCH(1)  1.013  44.62  0.00 
Avg. Return  0.907     
Dec. 1989  20.65  2.25  0.0239 
Fund  20.611  2.76  0.0058 
Nigeria  Coefficient  T-Stat  P-Value 
ARCH(1)  0.0254  3.65  0.0003 
GARCH(1)  0.532  1.697  0.0896 
Avg. Return  0.974     
Official  41.5  1.75  0.0788 WILLIAM MILES  122
Table 4.   Estimates of GARCH and Market Opening Effects: 
Pakistan and the Philippines 
Pakistan  Coefficient  T-Stat  P-Value 
ARCH(1)  0.4106  1.73  0.0836 
ARCH(2)  0.1654  1.03  0.302 
TARCH(1)  0.1536  0.7282  0.4664 
GARCH(1)  0.869  14.42  0.000 
Avg. Return  0.4322     
Dec. 1989  63.948  3.22  0.0013 
Official  34.298  1.888  0.0590 
Fund  75.507  3.962  0.0001 
US Break  87.22  2.478  0.0132 
Philippines  Coefficient  T-Stat  P-Value 
ARCH(1)  0.0019  ⴭ 0.794  0.426 
TARCH  0.00392  ⴭ 1.36  0.1737 
GARCH(1)  1.97  556.7  0.0000 
GARCH(2)  0.998  301.4  0.000 
Avg. Return  1.644     
Fund  0.499  ⴭ 2.166  0.03 
 
Table 5.   Estimates of GARCH and Market Opening Effects: 
Portugal, Taiwan and Thailand 
Portugal  Coefficient  T-Stat  P-Value 
ARCH(1)  ⴭ0.7361  3.17  0.0015 
GARCH(1)  ⴭ0.169  1.655  0.0978 
Avg. Return  ⴭ2.249     
Dec. 1989  77.78  2.19  0.0282 
US Break  17.34  1.683  0.0922 
Taiwan  Coefficient  T-Stat  P-Value 
ARCH(1)  ⴭ0.096078  1.207  0.2272 
GARCH(1)  ⴭ0.7969  6.402  0.000 
Avg. Return  ⴭ1.824     
Official  13.289  4.24  0.000 
ADR  11.439  2.32  0.0198 
Thailand  Coefficient  T-Stat  P-Value 
ARCH(1)  0.205  1.65  0.0988 
ARCH(2)  0.3352  3.064  0.0022 
Avg. Return  0.001281     
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Table 6.   Estimates of GARCH and Market Opening Effects: 
Venezuela and Zimbabwe 
Venezuela  Coefficient  T-Stat  P-Value 
ARCH(1)  1.383  3.541  0.004 
GARCH(1)  0.0475  2.914  0.0036 
TARCH  1.173  2.974  0.0029 
Avg. Return  1.614     
Official  93.058  3.042  0.0023 
US Break  75.12  1.94  0.0522 
Zimbabwe  Coefficient  T-Stat  P-Value 
ARCH(1)  0.1066  1.8278  0.0676 
ARCH(2)  0.01995  0.9903  0.322 
ARCH(3)  0.2412  0.5815  0.5609 
ARCH(4)  0.4416  3.323  0.0009 
Avg. Return  0.0011     
Official  0.0036  1.896  0.0579 
 
 
For ten of the seventeen countries at least one measure of reform is statistically 
significant, and figures one through ten display the conditional standard deviation for 
these countries. Interestingly, however, for six of the ten countries in which reform has a 
significant impact, the effect is to raise the conditional volatility of returns, while for the 
other four reform lowers return variability. The difference in impact is not surprising 
given the different findings of previous researchers-some found reform had no 
discernible effect, others found it increased, and yet others that it decreased volatility. 
The impact of a given reform in no doubt depends on other aspects of the financial 
institutional structure in the given economy in which it is undertaken.   
As noted in the previous section, an increase in the conditional variance is also an 
increase in the unconditional variance. The six countries for which reform measures 
raise volatility are Columbia, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. As 
noted in table three, in four of the six (all but Columbia and Zimbabwe) external 
measures-December of 1989, or the structural break in U.S. flows-were significant. 
Additionally, for four of the six (Columbia, Pakistan, and Venezuela and Zimbabwe) 
official reform also succeeded in raising the variance of returns. Also, for t wo nations 
(India and Pakistan) the introduction of country funds had a positive impact. The only 
reform measure that did not raise the variance for any nation was the introduction of 
ADRs. 
The four nations for which reform lowered the conditional variance are Nigeria, the 
Philippines, Portugal, and Taiwan. No real pattern emerges here. In two (Nigeria and 
Taiwan) official reform lowers variance. For Portugal, both the structural break in U.S. 
equity flows and December of 1989 lower volatility. In the Philippines, the introduction WILLIAM MILES  124
of country funds lowers variability. Finally, in Taiwan, in addition to official reform, the 
introduction of ADRs lowers the variance. 
The effect of liberalization thus differs across countries, and, as noted, likely 
depends on the particular institutional arrangements in financial markets in the particular 
nation. Overall, while no large patterns stand out, there are several results of note. First, 
for no Latin American nation does the variance of returns fall in response to any 
liberalization. For Asia, both Pakistan and India, which had been relatively closed both 
in their capital and trade accounts, show increased volatility as a result of liberalization. 
In East Asia, Thailand’s volatility rose, while Taiwan’s fell.   
For the specific liberalization measures, the end of official restrictions lowers the 
variance in two instances, and raises it in four others. The introduction of ADRs 
increases volatility in one case, and lowers it one other. Country funds, on the other 
hand, raise the variance three times, and lower volatility only once. The break in U.S. 
equity flows has a positive effect on the variance in two cases, and a negative impact in 
one. The December 1989 date raises variance in three cases, and lowers it only once. 
The l atter two measures of the impact of a changing external environment thus raise 
volatility in five cases, and lower variability in only two, indicating that lower world 
returns appear to raise local stock return variances. Overall, the results do not provide 




5.    CONCLUSION 
 
The theoretical priors regarding the effect of liberalization on stock return variance 
are ambiguous. Some models imply that allowing flows, or quantities to absorb shocks 
leaves prices more stable. On the other hand, models of herding and other market 
imperfections lead to fear of increased volatility once bourses are open to foreign 
participation. 
Results here demonstrate that the results of reform are often country-specific. 
Outside of the fact that no Latin American nation saw its volatility decrease, and that 
both Pakistan and India, which had been relatively closed both in terms of the current 
and capital accounts until recently, saw only increases in variability, no striking patterns 
emerge from the results. Policymakers thus may generally not expect that increased 
openness leads to greater tranquility on average. 
It is important to note that despite reform raising return variability more often than 
decreasing it, one should not conclude that reform is harmful to economic or overall 
financial development. Even if policymakers can reasonably expect an increase in return 
variance subsequent to liberalization, there are many other effects which are highly 
beneficial and may outweigh any welfare cost associated with higher volatility. Bekaert 
and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000) both document the clear effect that market opening 
has in raising prices, and hence lowering returns. These lower returns represent a lower FINANCIAL DEREGULATION AND VOLATILITY IN EMERGING EQUITY MARKETS  125
cost of capital to emerging markets, and allow for greater capital accumulation and 
hence economic growth. Market opening also allows investors worldwide greater 
opportunity for diversification. Results indicate, however, that reform cannot 
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